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California Court of Appeal Reverses Denial of Class Certification in 28-Day Shuffle Case

Key Findings

  • Published Decision Creates Precedent: The California Court of Appeal’s March 25, 2026 ruling in Aerni v. RR San Dimas L.P. is certified for publication, meaning it now guides courts and litigants statewide in similar 28-day shuffle cases.
  • Class-Wide Proof is Enough: Courts cannot require each individual class member to prove the hotel was their personal primary residence. Whether a hotel qualifies as a “residential hotel” under Civil Code section 1940.1 is a hotel-wide question answered through common evidence.
  • Vulnerable Guests are Protected: The 28-day shuffle strips unhoused and low-income Californians of basic tenant rights by cycling them out before they can accumulate 30 days of tenancy. This ruling restores a meaningful legal path to hold hotels accountable.

The People Behind the Case

Melissa Aerni and Katherine Atsaves weren’t tourists. They were people who needed a place to live. From June through November of 2022, they checked into the Red Roof Inn in San Dimas, California, again and again. Each time they reached 28 consecutive days, the hotel required them to check out completely and stay away for at least three days before they could return. During those mandatory gaps, they had nowhere to go. They typically slept in their vehicle or at another motel.

The hotel’s own representative acknowledged, under oath, that the policy existed in part to avoid creating a landlord-tenant relationship with its guests. By cycling guests out just before the 30-day mark that triggers tenancy rights under California law, the hotel kept everyone in a perpetual state of “transient occupancy” and denied them the legal protections that come with being a tenant, including the right to proper notice before removal, the right to habitable conditions, and protection against retaliatory eviction.

This is the 28-day shuffle. It has been illegal in California since the legislature passed Civil Code section 1940.1, but enforcement has remained difficult. Aerni v. RR San Dimas L.P. is now one of the most significant steps toward making that prohibition meaningful.

What Happened in the Trial Court

In November 2022, plaintiffs filed a class action against RR San Dimas L.P. and Mountain High/Holiday Hill Corporation, the owners of the Red Roof Inn in San Dimas, alleging violations of Civil Code section 1940.1, the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, negligence, and the Unfair Competition Law.

The proposed class was straightforward: every person who stayed at the hotel for at least 28 consecutive days and was required to check out before reaching 30 days, from November 2018 through the present. The hotel’s own records showed that more than 200 guests had checked out after exactly 28 days, and more than 50 had checked out and then reregistered after the mandatory 72-hour gap. Plaintiffs’ sampling suggested the class could exceed 1,700 individuals.

The trial court found the class numerous, ascertainable, and adequately represented. It found that the hotel’s blanket 28-day policy was itself subject to common proof. But it denied certification anyway, on a single ground: it concluded that each individual class member would have to prove the hotel was their own personal primary residence to establish that the hotel qualified as a “residential hotel” under Health and Safety Code section 50519. Because that would require one-by-one inquiries into each guest’s living situation, the court held that individualized issues predominated and a class action could not proceed.

Clarkson Law Firm’s writs and appeals team, led by partner Glenn A. Danas and counsel Brent A. Robinson alongside co-appellate counsel Yashdeep Singh of Yash Law Group, took the appeal.

What the Court of Appeal Decided

On March 25, 2026, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s ruling. The opinion, certified for publication, is now binding precedent.

The Trial Court Misread the Statute

The central question on appeal was statutory interpretation: does Civil Code section 1940.1 require each plaintiff to prove that the hotel was their own primary residence? The Court of Appeal read the statute carefully and answered no.

A “residential hotel” under Health and Safety Code section 50519 is defined by how the building as a whole is used or intended to be used, and by whether it is “primarily” occupied by transient guests. That is a hotel-level inquiry, not a guest-level one. The statute’s plain language places no requirement on individual plaintiffs to prove that the hotel served as their particular primary residence. A plaintiff must show only that (1) they occupied a residential hotel, (2) the hotel required them to leave before 30 days, and (3) the purpose was to keep them in transient occupancy status. The “primary residence” language in the statutory definition describes the character of the building, not a personal fact each plaintiff must establish.

Merits Questions Do Not Block Certification

The Court also addressed defendants’ fallback argument: that even if the hotel-wide residential status is a common question, courts would still need to examine each guest’s circumstances to determine the hotel’s character. The Court rejected this reasoning as well. Even if that kind of detailed inquiry were eventually required at trial, it would not become more complex by expanding the class. Merits questions that arise equally for all class members do not prevent certification; they are addressed together, as a class. Importing merits analysis into the certification stage to kill a class action is exactly the kind of legal error that warrants reversal.

The Court reversed the denial of class certification and remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider the certification question under the correct legal framework.

Why This Published Decision Matters Beyond This Case

The Court of Appeal was candid: this opinion is among the first published decisions in this area of law. That matters enormously. A published decision becomes binding authority throughout California, giving tenants, advocates, and courts a clear framework for evaluating 28-day shuffle claims going forward.

The legislature outlawed the 28-day shuffle in 1990 and strengthened the law in 2004 because it recognized the human cost of the practice. Committee reports described the hotel as a last resort for people who couldn’t afford more traditional housing, people for whom losing their room every 28 days meant losing what little stability they had.

The Aerni decision gives that legislative purpose teeth. Hotels that apply blanket 28-day shuffle policies can no longer defeat class actions by demanding individualized proof of each guest’s residency. Victims at other hotels with nearly identical policies now have judicial guidance to pursue their claims collectively, and class treatment means those claims can result in real monetary relief, including the $500 civil penalty per violation authorized by section 1940.1.

Clarkson’s Role

Clarkson Law Firm’s writs and appeals practice handled this case on behalf of the plaintiffs and appellants. Glenn A. Danas and Brent A. Robinson briefed the appeal and worked alongside co-counsel Yashdeep Singh of Yash Law Group. The resulting published opinion is now part of California law on class actions and residential hotel protections.

Clarkson’s appellate team works on cases where the stakes extend beyond the individual client, cases where the right outcome for one person can change the rules for thousands of others. This is one of those cases.

Contact Clarkson Law Firm

Contact us today for a free consultation with our experienced appeals & writs team. Our attorneys represent individuals and classes in consumer protection and civil rights cases across California, and we are committed to holding businesses accountable when they use unlawful policies to exploit the people least able to fight back.

The case is Melissa I. Aerni, et al. v. RR San Dimas L.P., et al., Case No. B341484, Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three.